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Nuclear security combines both concepts of physical security and security culture within a nuclear facility 
to protect people, property, society and the environment from harmful effects of ionization radiation. 
Physical security means prevention, detection, and response to unauthorized removal, sabotage, and/or 
illegal transfer involving radioactive sources and nuclear material. Nuclear security culture is the human 
factor within the nuclear field which is considered a principal means to support and enhance nuclear 
security system. This paper presents a study of nuclear security system already established within a 
radiological facility considering concepts such as: deter, detect, delay, and response layers. This study 
focuses on nuclear security culture in order to assess, improve, and complement existing nuclear security 
practices. 
 




The studied facility, Boukhalef Ionization Station SIBO, which is a part of the Regional Centre for 
Agronomic Research in Tangier, Morocco, uses a source of cobalt-60 to research how to peacefully apply 
nuclear energy to agronomy. Today, the capacity of the ionization source is 64,000 Ci, thanks to a 
recharging operation carried out in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
The IAEA’s mission is to research food preservation without chemical additives by adopting ionization 
techniques, as well as other dosimetry and dosimetric calibration research. 
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The SIBO station has a casemate equipped with a gamma radiation source, which generates gamma 
photons of energies 1.17 MeV and 1.33 MeV, with a maximum capacity of 100,000 Ci. While using this 
source, the radiation will lead to two safety concerns: radiation exposure and ozone gas. Before the 
operator closes the casemate door and start irradiation, workers ensure that nobody is inside, because the 
Co-60 source levels are high enough to cause death within a few minutes. Another concern is the ozone 
gas emissions which result from the interaction of gamma rays with air during the irradiation of products. 
When diatomic molecules of oxygen (O2) absorb radiation from irradiator, they break their connection 
and separate into two highly reactive atoms which combine with a third molecule of oxygen produce 
ozone (O3). Breathing this gas can trigger a variety of health problems including chest pain, coughing, 
throat irritation, and airway inflammation. It also can reduce lung function and harm lung tissue. 
Therefore, ventilation is necessary, and scientists recommend researchers to wait a few minutes after 
irradiation before removing the irradiated products from the casemate. 
 
Since the source of cobalt-60 is classified among category 1 sources, the security requirements applied in 
the SIBO ionization station are based on the nuclear security performance objectives for radioactive 
security sources of level A of the IAEA publication No. 11. 
 
In this study, we will focus on improving physical protection measures and nuclear security culture within 
this radiological installation in order to achieve efficient nuclear security systems. 
II. The History of Nuclear Security and Nuclear Security 
Culture in the Ionization Station SIBO 
The nuclear security system was installed in different phases. During the first phase in 2002, only two 
cameras were installed. The second phase was initiated a few years later to improve existing security 
system in the site access control system, intrusion detection system, and CCTV system. The main 
enhancement however, was the installation of a Central Alarm System (CAS) by security specialists in the 
police control station to monitor the Irradiator Building [1]. The third phase of development focuses on 
the physical security measures and the operational security culture revolving around nuclear security at 
the ionization station SIBO.  
III. Nuclear Security Measures at Radiological Facilities 
A. Physical Protection Measures 
The purpose of a nuclear security system for radioactive material, associated facilities, and associated 
activities is to protect people, property, society, and the environment from malicious acts that could cause 
unacceptable radiological consequences [2]. 
 
Therefore, the key stakeholders should establish a modern security system for protecting radioactive 
material/sources used in associated facilities and related activities against unauthorized removal. They 
should also work towards protecting radioactive facilities against sabotage, in addition to ensuring the 
implementation of rapid and comprehensive measures to locate and recover radioactive material which is 
lost, missing, or stolen, and to re-establish regulatory control. 
 
These objectives are realized through security measures which should be designed to perform basic 
security functions: deterrence, detection, delay, response, and security management. 
 
These security measures should be based on a risk informed graded approach, and they should also use 
the concept of defense in depth after determination of a national threat to radioactive material in use, 
storage, and transport to/from associated facilities [2]. 
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States should develop security requirements that protect radioactive material from unauthorized removal 
or loss of control. States should address both security systems and security management to ensure 
protection [2]. 
 
The regulatory body should require operators to implement a security system that meets applicable 
nuclear security regime objectives. Operators should design a system that can adequately perform security 
functions in order to deter and prevent malicious acts. While deterrence is not measurable, it is clear that a 
suitably robust security system can help to deter a malicious act. By implementing a graded approach, 
such a security system could then be deployed to undertake multiple security measures from prevention of 
malicious activities to reducing the probability of its occurrence [2]. 
1. Detection 
We can achieve the detection measures by different means as visual observation, video 
surveillance, electronic sensors, accountancy records, seals and other tamper indicating devices, 
and process monitoring systems. 
 
By implementing a graded approach, the objectives of detection measures could range from 
immediate detection, assessment, and communication of any unauthorized access to subsequent 
detection of unauthorized removal through tamper indicators or periodic physical checks [2]. 
2. Delay 
Operators should implement delay measures to impede an adversary’s attempt to gain 
unauthorized access, remove radioactive material, or sabotage associated facilities through 
multiple barriers or other physical means, such as locked doors, cages, tie-downs or the like. A 
measure of delay is the time, after detection, that is required by an adversary to remove the 
radioactive material or sabotage the associated facilities. By implementing a graded approach, 
operators can range the delay measures from providing sufficient delay after detection (to allow 
response personnel to interrupt malicious acts) to providing delay to allow for timely pursuit 
following unauthorized removal [2]. 
3. Response 
The operator should be required to communicate with law enforcement personnel following 
detection and assessment to respond in a timely manner.  The objectives of response measures 
could range from immediately interrupting malicious acts to sounding alarm notifications to allow 
the appropriate authority to investigate the event. The operator should assist the competent 
authorities as appropriate in their efforts to locate and recover the radioactive material, including 
cooperation in on-site and off-site responses [2]. 
4. Security Management 
Operators should be required to implement security management measures, addressing access 
control, trustworthiness, information protection, security plan preparation, training and 
qualification, accounting, inventory, and event reporting. The stringency of appropriate security 
management measures should vary based on the graded approach [2]. 
B. Nuclear Security Culture and its Characteristics 
Nuclear security culture is defined as the assembly of characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors of 
individuals, organizations, and institutions that supports and enhances nuclear security [3]. 
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The human is an important factor in nuclear security. He or she has a great role and responsibility in all 
activities of radioactive materials, processes, and management. Therefore, a plethora of individuals and 
various disciplines and organizations must work together, among them: the State, organizations, managers 
in organizations, personnel, the public, and the international community. Together, through coordination 
and dialogue, these stakeholders develop a nuclear security culture. 
 
The greatest influences on individual performance are the beliefs, attitudes, behaviors, and management 
systems. These layers are the characteristics of nuclear security culture, the proper assembly of which 
leads to more effective nuclear security. 
 
Security culture model for radioactive sources is based on goals, principles for guiding decisions and 
behaviors, and beliefs and attitudes. These three layers are broadly applicable to radiological facilities and 
organizations, including radioactive source users and other entities that handle or store radioactive 
material. Each of these layers is described in the following sections. 
1. Beliefs and attitudes as drivers of people’s behavior 
Without a strong substructure of beliefs and attitudes about threats, an effective security culture 
cannot exist. Efforts to instill such beliefs and attitudes must be carefully calibrated to reach 
everyone working in the facility. The most important assumption for security culture is that there 
is a real insider and outsider threat. Understanding that a radiological event could have 
devastating health, environmental, economic, social, and psychological impacts is likely to 
reinforce the belief that a robust security regime is not only desirable but also necessary [4]. 
2. Leadership behavior as role models 
Managerial behavior and proactive security leadership help improve awareness and culture at all 
levels. Leaders are vital components in dealing with malicious capabilities, unintentional 
personnel errors, inadequate organizational procedures, and management failures. They are in a 
position to integrate the security regime for radioactive sources into an organization’s security 
arrangements. Leaders can promote new and different assumptions and patterns of thinking, 
establish new patterns of behavior, and change the physical environment, mentality, and guiding 
principles. Culture, therefore, tends to mirror the real intentions, specific actions, and priorities of 
the management [4]. 
3. Management systems as tools to promote desired patterns of 
behavior 
The management systems integrate characteristics that either relate directly to the security of 
radioactive sources or are part of the managerial framework, without which security cannot be 
ensured and maintained. They are designed and shaped by senior management consistent with 
their vision of an effective security culture and the need for appropriate management tools to 
facilitate and support this process. At the same time, management systems ensure that health, 
environment, safety, quality, and economic requirements are not considered separately from 
security requirements, averting possible negative impacts on security. Characteristics of 
management systems include visible and effective security policy; the safety-security interface; 
clear definition of roles and responsibilities; trustworthiness determination; training and 
qualifications; information security; change management; contingency plans and drills; interface 
with regulations and other off-site organizations; and record keeping [4]. 
4. Personnel behavior as key to robust and sustainable security 
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The ultimate objective of security culture development is a set of desired standards of personnel 
behavior. Security awareness and culture are driven by personnel beliefs that security avoids 
malicious radiological events, which may have devastating health, environmental, economic, 
social, and psychological effects. While security awareness is a low-tier construct applicable to 
the entire workforce, more rigorous efforts must concentrate on a high-tier culture construct that 
targets individuals who manage and operate radioactive sources as well as those professionally 
associated with their use. There are many overlaps between awareness and culture, and they are 
often used interchangeably, but the latter implies commitment and ownership rather than 
awareness of possible risks and vulnerabilities. Culture is a more proactive construct than 
awareness. The behavior of personnel conscious of security culture includes the following 
characteristics: professionalism and security awareness, compliance, personal accountability, 
mutual respect and cooperation, and vigilance and reporting [4].  
5. Goal: more effective nuclear security 
The goal of discussing the issues above is establishing an effective nuclear security culture 
through providing a greater assurance that the entire nuclear security program will accomplish its 
functions of preventing, detecting, delaying, and responding to theft, sabotage, unauthorized 
access, and illegal storage or transport [3].  
IV. Importance of Continual Self-assessment of Nuclear 
Security Measures 
Because the threats are always evolving, it is necessary to continually assess the existing nuclear security 
systems and improve upon them to ensure they are consistent with the current threat. If personnel 
understand that their contribution to nuclear security is important, then they will be motivated to 
implement the nuclear security system effectively and vigilantly, and contribute to its improvement [5]. 
 
The purpose of self-assessing a nuclear security system is to provide a clear picture of the extent to which 
the security system is valid, recognizing its weaknesses and strengths. 
 
Self-assessment involves evaluating the key security system in the organization by comparing certain 
indicators. Indicators serve as gauges, enabling one to compare current performance to reference levels 
corresponding to optimal nuclear security. This assessment is an evaluation of a nuclear security system 
through continual technical examination, which allows one to know whether this system performs its 
functions properly, discover the weaknesses, and troubleshoot damages in real time. 
 
Without harmony between personnel and the security system, an effective security measures cannot exist. 
Thus, promoting the importance of nuclear security and enhancing nuclear security culture is an ongoing 
activity. 
 
The self-assessment of nuclear security culture is a tool used to understand the beliefs and attitudes held 
by personnel that support effectiveness of nuclear security. Self-assessment also allows a competent 
authority/facility/activity to build on those beliefs and attitudes and to diagnose signs of complacency. 
The level of nuclear security culture may be difficult to assess as some aspects of culture are not visible. 
However, by using various methods, including written questionnaires, focus groups, surveys, and oral 
interviews, one can better understand the existing culture. It is important to recognize that the most 
accurate feedback is attained from a variety of these assessment methods. 
 
Self-assessment may be conducted at the onset of implementing an enhancement program. Doing so can 
indicate what specific efforts should be included in the action plan. Afterwards, the culture coordinator 
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may regularly implement self-assessments (e.g., every two years) to evaluate results of the existing 
enhancement program and update the action plan accordingly. Self-assessments, with subsequent 
development of prioritized action plans that address root causes of difficulties, are essential to 
maintaining a strong nuclear security culture [5]. 
 
Security culture self-assessment helps both those directly involved with nuclear security and the rest of 
the organization by illuminating how culture influences security performance. Effective self-assessment 
encourages staff to accept ownership of the results and facilitates decisions that foster continuous 
improvement. Benefits of self-assessment include: 
• A deeper understanding of the human factor and nuclear security culture 
• A clearer understanding of employees’ concerns, needs, aspirations, and motives 
• The identification of barriers to and incentives for improvements to security performance 
• The identification of barriers to and motives for change 
• The clarification of employees’ opinions on security-related topics 
• An improved capacity to self-assess the organization’s security performance and to analyze trends 
within the site or monitor progress 
• The increased prioritization of actions that strengthen the overall organizational culture in areas 
such as internal communication and human resource management [6] 
 
Self-assessment of nuclear security culture should complement the currently used methods for evaluating 
vulnerabilities and nuclear security systems, thus helping management to refine the organization’s overall 
nuclear security arrangements [6]. 
V. Study Conducted in Tangier to Improve Both Physical 
Protection and Nuclear Security Culture 
In order to improve physical protection and nuclear security culture within the Ionization Station SIBO, 
we have created a team to carefully study nuclear security. We started by making a simple map that 
contained the nuclear security system already established within the facility on which we based our 
theoretical study. It mentioned different areas which could be considered vital, and we took numerous 
measurements including the height and width of the walls, hardness of doors, effectiveness of detection 
systems, response time, and many others key notes were written in a special document for future 
discussion. 
 
We had also established a few potential scenarios for removal of the radioactive sources or sabotage of 
the facility. The scenarios have been replicated in reality to help us to have a clear vision about the 
effectiveness of the security system and discover its strengths and weaknesses. Some example scenarios 
include: 
• Calculated the time it would take an adversary to reach the door of the ionization station from the 
main door of regional center with different routes 
• Calculated the time it would take to break the door to enter the ionization station if the adversary 
hasn't been detected, considering whether the adversary has access inside the station 
• In addition, we calculated the time it would take to get from the ionization station doors to the 
casemate which contain the source taking into consideration the various paths and whether the 
adversary would have access or if they must break doors to achieve their goal 
• Calculated how long it would take the response forces to deter the adversary in each attempt 
 
To assess the effect of human factor in nuclear security within this facility, we asked to each team 
member to present ideas that could help improve nuclear security. These presentations had been shared in 
meetings which were held every 15 days. 
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In the following section we will share the results and recommendations of the study involving nuclear 
security system as well as nuclear security culture. 
VI. Results and Recommendations 
The primary physical protection objective is preventing unauthorized individuals from getting access to 
radioactive material and stealing it from the facility. The use of penetration delay barriers securing the 
material buys time for the guards to call for assistance and contain or delay adversaries until the arrival of 
the response force [7]. The ionization station needs strong and sufficient fences to deter any attempted 
theft or sabotage. In this study we started with the wall which surround the facility and some area which 
contain glass windows. After obtaining all measurements and reviewing likely scenarios, we 
recommended barbed wire affixed to the entire wall that surrounds the regional center of agriculture, 
rather than limiting it to the wall surrounding the radiological plant. This measure can provide an absolute 
security efficiency. We also found that it would be better to replace all glass windows with barred ones, 
which would be stronger and higher off the ground. 
 
Regarding security guards, we had proposed to install another new permanent guard post in addition to 
the old one. This post would be managed by two security officers, with a crossing barrier to reinforce 
external security. 
 
In addition to layers and fences, prevention measure would be implemented to deter adversaries. Among 
prevention measures we had proposed: 
• A pointing system that tracks the presence of staff and trainees, recording the date, time and type 
of check-in (entry / exit) 
• A paper registry which bears the name of any individual (staff, trainees, visitors,..) who has 
accessed the interior of the installation and a scanned copy for not losing the information 
• Installing extra external lighting lamps along the fenced perimeter to give clear vision and deter 
any attempt of intrusion during the night 
 
The detection features are vital, so we suggested additional means of detection, to determine the entry 
control effectiveness, and assess intrusions: 
• Installing a walkthrough metal detector at the entrance of the ionization station that can detect 
gamma radiation and neutron radiation (weapons, explosives...) 
• Adding surveillance camera in areas considered blind spots in the facility  
• Changing the current analogical surveillance cameras to IP cameras in order to improve image 
quality. 
 
Delay comes just after detection; in this regard we suggested replacing the turnstile door with a barred 
turnstile which offers a high level of security for a single person crossing and an access control system. 
 
On the other hand, it is imperative to take into consideration the human factors in order to succeed the 
security system. Below are propositions to strengthen the nuclear security culture within the studied 
station. 
A. Performance Measurements 
Surveys are important for self-assessment because they establish a baseline for tracking changes over 
time. Therefore, we set up a survey in order to assess everyone's involvement. 
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B. Task Management 
The management system defines a set of activities related to the set of services (IT, analysis, verification, 
validation, decision-making, etc.). The aim of this system is to give flexibility in carrying out tasks, 
consistent work and a well-developed management system which prioritize security. 
C. Effective Communication 
Effective communication is a main tool to develop the security of each organization. To improve 
communication, we focused on some points as follows: 
• Holding more meetings that can encourage team members to communicate effectively and make 
each person participate in discussions about their current missions, priorities and objectives. The 
meetings can be held weekly and briefly where each person has 2-3 minutes to present their work. 
Special attention should be paid to identifying problems and possible solutions. 
• Including videos to keep people moving since they keep everyone informed of major (and even 
minor) changes and events in the business. 
• Build an anonymous suggestion box, since each person is different and therefore communicates 
differently. Some staff feel comfortable proposing ideas face to face while others prefer making 
contributions anonymously. 
VII. Conclusion 
Because of the weight and size of the container (5 tons), the theft of the Co-60 source is highly unlikely, 
but sabotage remains a potential concern, however. Following the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001, there is concern that the source is vulnerable to attack by commercial aircraft. This 
study was done in order to reduce risks associated with variant threats that can target the facility and the 
radioactive source of Co-60. The results were very satisfying especially for nuclear security culture to 
improve and strengthen nuclear security in the studied station. Such improvements can also deter insider 
threats and therefore reduce threats induced or facilitated by these insiders. 
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